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HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE CLEAN
FINANCIAL BREAK
NATHAN W. ANDERSEN AND L. JOHN LESUEUR

No-fault divorce does not properly compensate women for their efforts to
raise children. Only by incorporating human capital in the divorce settlement can women be properly compensated for their investments.

I

n recent years courts have used the clean break philosophy to settle
divorce, attempting to equally divide property accumulated during
marriage. This approach allows both husbands and wives to walk
away from divorce relatively free from long-term financial interdependence. However, many legal scholars claim that a clean financial break
undercompensates women relative to men. This leads to the argument
that a clean financial break is incompatible with equitable divorce
settlements, causing some legal scholars to reject the clean financial
break as the optimal method of adjudicating divorce. In an attempt to
both maintain the clean financial break and provide more equitable
settlements, some legal scholars suggest expanding the scope of property by viewing human capital acquired during marriage as an asset to
be split between spouses upon divorce. The inclusion of human capital
as property creates greater equality in divorce settlements while maintaining the benefits of a clean financial break.
The notion of a clean financial break first began when fault-based
divorce was replaced by no-fault divorce. Prior to the 1970s, divorce
was granted “only upon proof that one of the parties was at fault for
having breached spousal duties.”1 Through this system, alimony was
awarded more or less to the party that was at fault. Because of this system, fault-based settlements usually created a web of financial entanglements, prohibiting the couple from doing exactly what divorce intended
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them to do—break all ties emotionally, physically, and financially.
Milton C. Regan Jr., in his article “Spouses and Strangers: Divorce
Obligations and Property Rhetoric,” concludes that fault-based divorce
“formally treated ex-spouses as ongoing family members whose claims
against one another continued to reflect the fact of their marriage.”2
In 1970, California initialized no-fault divorce, completely eliminating
fault as a consideration for determining alimony. According to Jana B.
Singer, “facilitating a clean financial break replaced punishing a guilty
spouse (or protecting an innocent one) as the overriding objective of
divorce-related financial adjustments.”3 This change rid couples of lifelong financial connections and enabled them to move on with their
lives.4 The transition from fault-based divorce to no-fault divorce established the clean financial break in divorce settlements, necessitating the
courts to reexamine the definition of marital property.
While administering a clean financial break, courts must separate
each spouse’s personal property from jointly owned marital property.
Once courts determine what constitutes marital property (usually
defined as property acquired during marriage), they simply divide it
between both spouses equally.5 However, even this simple definition
does not prevent disputes between spouses about whether certain assets
are personal or marital property. Legal scholars have suggested that the
boundaries of marital property become clearer when marriage is viewed
in economic terms, with the market being the motivating force behind
all marital interaction. Joan M. Krauskopf, a law professor at the University of Missouri at Columbia, writes:
In economic analysis, the family is a decision making unit that operates to maximize the unit’s utility in consumption and also in the
allocation of human time and production activities. This view of the
family is an application of the traditional economic theory of the
firm.6

Krauskopf continues by suggesting that the traditional family unit is
extremely efficient in allocating the family’s resources—both time and
money—in order to maximize returns. Although economic principles
do not completely explain marital behavior, viewing marriage in economic terms can be helpful in deciphering marital property boundaries.
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Currently, courts do not view educational degrees acquired by
either spouse during marriage as marital property. Because of this, a
clean financial break will undercompensate domestic spouses. The following scenario illustrates this inequity. Suppose a young couple, Tom
and Sue, get married while both are still in college. Because of their
limited budget, Sue quits school in order to support the completion of
Tom’s legal education. She financially provides for him during these
years, driven by the hope of someday reaping the financial rewards of
her husband’s increased future income. However, shortly after Tom
graduates from law school they divorce. At this point, Tom’s future
earning potential far exceeds his wife’s. In addition, the couple’s traditional property (cars, real estate, housing, and so forth) is extremely
limited. If a clean financial break were to occur, dividing only their
traditional property, Sue would be undercompensated relative to Tom.
This simple example illustrates that, although a clean financial break is
ideal, divorce settlements need adjustment in order to accommodate
nontraditional forms of property. Krauskopf and other scholars have
presented the human capital theory as the solution.
Human capital theory explains the wages of laborers as a function
of the training they receive.7 The origin of this theory dates back to the
early 1960s when some economists realized “that a substantial growth
in income in the United States remains [unexplained] after the
growth in physical capital and labor has been accounted for.”8 In an
effort to explain this rise in income, Gary S. Becker, one of the pioneering scholars of the human capital theory, pointed to the investments
human beings make in themselves by receiving “schooling, on-the-job
training, medical care,” and so forth.9 Becker called these types of
investments “human capital investments.” By including the growth in
human capital with the growth in physical capital and labor, Becker
successfully captured more of the rise in income experienced in the
United States. As a result of this success, human capital theory has
become very influential in explaining labor wages.
Additionally, some economists claim that human capital theory
will continue to explain more and more of labor wages as our economy
evolves. For example, Allen M. Parkman, Professor of Management at
the University of New Mexico, claims that the primary sources of income “in a manufacturing and agricultural [economy]” are “physical
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assets, such as houses and land, and financial assets, such as stocks and
bonds.”10 Whereas in an economy dominated by a large service sector,
“the primary income producing assets become the individuals themselves.”11 Thus, as our economy continues to become more and more
service oriented, we should expect to see a decrease of investments in
traditional types of capital and an increase of investments in human
capital. This will make it even more important for the courts to recognize human capital as marital property.
Due to the work of human capital theorists, economists have
broadened their definition of property to include human capital. For
example, economists define investment as “anything that accumulates
capital” and capital as “a stock of assets that yields a stream of income
or utility over time.”12 If these definitions are used as the determinants
of capital (property), then no distinction can be made between a person’s investments in schooling and his or her investments in physical
capital, such as real estate. The inability to draw an economic distinction between these two types of investments leads to the argument that
courts should treat both types of investments equally when adjudicating divorces. Thus, in order for clean break settlements to be just,
courts must broaden the legal definition of property to include human
capital.13 The example of Tom and Sue illustrates this point. A clean
break settlement that does not grant Sue part-ownership of the human
capital her husband acquired during their marriage will greatly undercompensate her for her investments in the marriage. However, courts
have almost uniformly rejected the inclusion of human capital as
marital property.
Regan suggests four main reasons why courts have not viewed
human capital as marital property. First, the most common justification
used by the courts is that, in their eyes, a degree such as a law or medical degree does not fall under the traditional definition of property
because “it has no exchange value or any objective value on an open
market.”14 For instance, it is impossible to buy, sell, or trade an educational degree for money or anything else. Regan explains it well when
he states that a degree “cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed,
or pledged.”15
A classic example of this understanding is found in Graham v.
Graham.16 In this 1978 case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the
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husband’s M.B.A. was not considered property because it did not have
any open market exchange value.17 Here the court correctly identifies
the impossibility of separating human capital assets from their owners.
However, even if human capital “cannot be assigned, sold, transferred,
conveyed, or pledged,”18 it can be rented. Fundamental to human capital theory is the concept that individuals who embody a set of skills can
rent those skills to employers. If individuals could not rent their skills,
there would be no justification for employers to pay higher wages to
degree holders than to non-degree holders. In Graham v. Graham, the
court argued that if something is not marketable, then it is not property. However, by failing to recognize that human capital can be rented
to employers, the court mistakenly identifies human capital as not
marketable. Thus, in this argument, the court fails to demonstrate that
human capital is not property.
Secondly, Regan states that the courts are hesitant to identify
human capital as property in divorce settlements because the “valuation
of future earning capacity is highly speculative.”19 Although economists
are fairly successful at valuing human capital assets across large samples
of people, they are unable to pinpoint the exact future income a specific individual’s human capital will produce. This is because future
income is contingent upon many variables, such as luck or enthusiasm,
which tend to balance out in large samples of people but greatly affect
the income of specific individuals. Courts have argued that the speculation required to divide human capital assets provides justification for
not dividing the assets at all. However, the courts have been willing to
speculate the value of future incomes in tort cases for years.20 Therefore,
if courts wish to be consistent, they must not use this reason for not
including human capital as marital property.
Part of the reason courts hesitate to speculate on future income is
that, in a clean financial break, property settlements at divorce are not
modifiable.21 This inability to modify divorce settlements also leads to
a third reason courts hesitate to classify human capital as property.
Courts fear that ex-spouses, especially professionals, could be trapped
in their careers due to heavy financial obligations, “and thus [be]
severely restricted in the liberty to choose a more satisfying way of
life.”22 Referring again to Tom and Sue, suppose Tom was required to
provide a large payment to Sue in compensation for her investments in
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his education. After being divorced for a year, Tom decides that he is
unhappy as a lawyer and wishes to be a high school teacher. Because
the earning capacity of a lawyer far exceeds the earning capacity of a
teacher, Tom decides he is unable to both make the career change and
fulfill his financial obligation toward his ex-wife. Some may argue that
incorporating human capital as property threatens the freedom of
people like Tom to choose their careers. However, trying to protect
Tom’s freedom to change careers jeopardizes Sue’s investments. If courts
agree that Sue has invested in Tom’s human capital, they must agree
that Tom has borrowed from Sue. Thus, Tom should be free to choose
whatever career he wishes, so long as he reimburses Sue for her investment. Because Sue invested in Tom’s human capital during the
marriage—when the marital contract was in force—the need to protect
Sue’s prior investment outweighs the loss of Tom’s ability to change
occupations. Consequently, courts should not use this justification in
attempting to separate human capital from marital property.
Lastly, some judges purport that even if human capital is property,
it should not be considered marital property.23 In the 1984 case Sullivan
v. Sullivan,24 Judge Kaufman stated that the future value of an educational degree “is entirely dependent upon the future efforts of the
educated spouse.”25 Here, Judge Kaufman seems to imply that owning
capital necessitates control over how that capital is used. However, the
purchasing of stocks presents a case where individuals own capital but
have no control over how that capital is deployed.26 For example, an
ordinary purchaser of Microsoft stock does not gain control over how
that capital is used. Nevertheless, while Microsoft maintains the right
to deploy their capital as they choose, individual stock purchasers are
entitled to the returns on their investment. Thus, spouses’ lack of
control over their partners’ human capital does not exclude them from
owning the returns on their investments. Because courts assert that
human capital is separate property, many women are not being justly
compensated for their investments.
The clean financial break has advantages over other divorce
philosophies because it bestows ex-spouses freedom from long-term
financial entanglements. If a clean financial break is to provide equitable divorce settlements, human capital acquired during marriage
must be viewed as marital property.27 This inclusion promises to reward
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domestic spouses more justly for their contributions to the marriage.
Defining human capital as property promises fairness in divorce settlements much more than the current no-fault system.
Nathan W. Andersen is a senior at Brigham Young University majoring in
English with a critical writing emphasis. He will attend the J. Reuben Clark Law
School at BYU this fall.
L. John LeSueur is majoring in economics with a minor in philosophy at Brigham
Young University. He plans to begin law school this fall.
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